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TRANSPARENCY AND RELIANCE IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Steven L. Willborn+

All antidiscrimination laws have two structural features – transparency and
reliance – that are important, even central, to their design, but have gone largely
unnoticed. On transparency, some laws, like the recent salary-ban laws, attempt
to prevent the employer from learning about the disfavored factor on the theory
that an employer cannot rely on an unknown factor. Other laws require
publication of the disfavored factor, such as salary, on the theory that it is harder
to discriminate in the sunlight. Still other laws are somewhere between these two
extremes. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, limits but does not
preclude employer inquiries into disability status. On reliance, most
antidiscrimination statutes, like Title VII, ban reliance on disfavored factors. But
other statutes do the opposite of banning reliance – they require employers to
rely on the factor. For example, a general feature of accommodation statutes is
an obligation on employers to rely on the identified factor. Still other laws, like
the salary-ban laws, permit but do not require reliance.
This article is the first to explore these important and surprisingly unnoticed
and unexplored features of antidiscrimination laws. Viewing antidiscrimination
laws through the lens of transparency and reliance presents a new and interesting
way to think about current laws and a roadmap for thinking about where future
laws should be placed within the transparency-reliance matrix.

+
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INTRODUCTION
The antidiscrimination laws have two structural features that are important,
even central, to their design, but have gone largely unnoticed. Compare, for
example, recent salary-ban statutes with Title VII. Many of the salary-ban
statutes make it illegal for an employer to ask about past salary, but do not make
it illegal to rely on past salary in setting pay if the employer discovers the
information without asking.1 Title VII, on the other hand, does not bar
1. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40z (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(b)(2)
(2022). It should be noted that while a common feature of the salary-ban laws is that the employer
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employers from asking about race or gender, but the statute makes it illegal to
rely on either in making an employment decision.2 This article is the first to
explore these important and surprisingly unnoticed and unexplored structural
features of antidiscrimination laws.
Both features come in multiple varieties. The first one I am going to call
transparency. One antidiscrimination strategy is to prevent the employer from
learning about a disfavored factor; the theory is that if the employer does not
know about the factor, it cannot rely on it.3 That is the underlying theory of the
salary-ban and ban-the-box laws.4 They are far to the opaque side of the
transparency continuum. But other antidiscrimination efforts are far to the other
side of the continuum on the theory that it is harder to discriminate in the
sunlight. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) effort to
gather and publicize salary data is on this side.5 Still other laws are somewhere
between these two extremes. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example,
limits but does not preclude employer inquiries into disability status.6

cannot ask about salary information, they are quite varied on whether reliance on past salary is
permitted. For example, other salary-ban laws prohibit inquiries about salary history, but permit
reliance only under certain conditions, most commonly if the applicant volunteers the information.
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(h) (West 2022); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.4(b) (2021). Finally,
some statutes do not permit inquiries about or reliance on salary history. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a
(McKinney 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2021). For other examples of laws that prohibit
inquiries about certain factors, but permit reliance, see infra notes 35-37.
2. See infra notes 15-16.
3. See Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2097, 2121–22 (2014); Ignacio N. Cofone, Antidiscrimination Privacy, 72 SMU L. REV.
139, 148–49 (2019).
4. See supra note 1. For a listing of state and local laws restricting employer inquiries about
criminal history, see A Guide to Ban the Box Laws at State and County, and City Levels,
INTELLICORP (Apr. 2021), https://www.intellicorp.net/marketing/IntelliCorp/media/intellicorp/
IntelliCorp-BanTheBoxGuide-Version-20-2021-docx.pdf.
5. The EEOC required private employers with 100 or more employees to report pay data for
2017 and 2018 within 12 pay ranges. This was the so-called “Component 2” data collection
authorized under the Obama administration and administered, with reluctance, by the Trump
administration only after court order. See Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F.
Supp. 3d 66, 90 (D.D.C. 2019). In September 2019, the EEOC announced that it would collect
only “Component 1” data (non-compensation demographic data) in the next reporting cycles for
calendar years 2019, 2020, and 2021. Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing
Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,138, 48,139 (Sept. 9, 2019). The Securities and Exchange Commission
has an analogous initiative that requires public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation
of its chief executive to the median compensation of its employees. The SEC adopted the
requirement by rule in 2015. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104 (Aug. 18, 2015). The rule
was required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010). Although on the fringes of “antidiscrimination”
law, this is also a law that attempts to address a labor issue (wage disparities) through transparency
alone, without a ban on reliance.
6. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) [hereinafter ADA]. See
infra note 50.
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The other feature I am going to call reliance. As with transparency, reliance
comes in many flavors. The most noted discrimination statutes ban reliance on
the disfavored factor. An employer cannot rely on race or gender under Title
VII,7 or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.8 The precise
nature of that reliance is perhaps the most debated feature of these statutes and
variation exists even in these “ban” statutes, but that is not my concern here.9
My focus is on broader differences in reliance between statutes. As mentioned,
the salary-ban statutes, somewhat ironically, often do not ban reliance on past
salary in setting pay. Instead, they ban transparency.10 Still other statutes do the
opposite of banning reliance––they require employers to rely on the factor. For
example, a general feature of accommodation statutes is a requirement that
employers must rely on the identified factor. When an employer knows an
individual has a disability requiring an accommodation, it must attend to the
otherwise disfavored factor to try to make it possible for the person to work.11
This is also true for the increasingly common pregnancy accommodation
statutes.12
This article identifies and discusses transparency and reliance⎯two central
and important structural features of antidiscrimination law. Transparency and
reliance can be used as a lens through which to view virtually every
discrimination law; they provide a new window into past and current
antidiscrimination efforts, such as race and gender discrimination and the more
recent salary-ban statutes, but they also promise new insights into how to deal
with emerging issues, such as implicit bias and artificial intelligence.13 These
applications, and others, will be discussed in this article. The focus of the article,
however, is not on any particular application of these structural features, but
rather on the underlying structure itself, the largely unnoticed and unremarked
scaffolding on which antidiscrimination law is built. Detailed application to
particular issues will be left to future work.
The article begins in Section I by discussing transparency and reliance in
general. As a first cut, transparency and reliance can be viewed as a two-by-two
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 [hereinafter Title VII].
8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 [hereinafter ADEA]. Both
statutes, like most, provide a limited bona fide occupational qualification exception to the
prohibition against relying on the disfavored factors. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
9. See infra notes 63–64.
10. See supra note 1.
11. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring reasonable accommodation to a known
physical or mental limitation).
12. Thirty-one states, including the District of Columbia, have laws requiring at least some
employers to reasonably accommodate pregnant workers. See Reasonable Accommodations for
Pregnant Workers: State and Local Laws, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES (Sept. 2020),
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/pregnancydiscrimination/reasonable-accommodations-for-pregnant-workers-state-laws.pdf.
13. See infra notes 133-44.
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matrix with transparency high or low and reliance permitted or not.14 Section I
will include a census of antidiscrimination laws, which demonstrates that laws
exist in all four quadrants of this transparency/reliance matrix. The section will
then discuss more nuanced, non-dichotomous variations of the two features.
Section II will then dive deeper into the features to discuss just how sharp the
distinctions are between the categories and what factors might explain why a
particular law is placed within one quadrant or another. Section III focuses on
the decisions of lawmakers about where to place a particular nondiscrimination
obligation within the matrix. What are the considerations that would favor
transparency versus non-transparency or reliance versus non-reliance? Section
IV will then apply these considerations to current antidiscrimination laws to
explore how transparency and reliance illuminate and (mostly) explain implicit
choices that legislators made about where to place discrimination prohibitions
within the transparency/reliance matrix. Finally, Section V will provide a
glimpse into the future to illustrate how explicit consideration of transparency
and reliance might improve the precision and effectiveness of new contributions
to antidiscrimination law.
I. THINKING ABOUT TRANSPARENCY AND RELIANCE
A. Transparency and Reliance⎯a First Cut
Although neither transparency nor reliance is dichotomous, a good first-cut at
the structural features and their relationship is to view them in that way. Figure
1 illustrates the four possible categories when the two factors are treated as
dichotomous. Current laws exist that fit into each category.
Transparency

No

High

Low

1

2

3

4

Reliance

Yes

14. See infra Section I.
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Quadrant one⎯high transparency on factors the employer cannot rely on––is
the most common antidiscrimination category. Title VII and the ADEA fit into
this category. Neither has limitations on transparency; it is not a violation of
either act to ask about the prohibited categories or to find out in other ways.15
Thus, transparency is high. But both broadly prohibit reliance on the prohibited
categories. It is a violation of Title VII to rely on race or gender in making an
employment decision;16 it is a violation of the ADEA to rely on age in making
an employment decision.17 The antiretaliation provisions in antidiscrimination
laws (and generally) also fit into this category, maybe even more squarely. The
obligation not to retaliate arises only if the employer knows that the employee
has participated in a discrimination proceeding or opposed an illegal practice.18
Thus, the no-reliance obligation can arise only if transparency is present.
Quadrant two––low transparency on factors the employer cannot rely on––
includes most of the ban-the-box laws,19 the Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act,20 and some applications of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.21 A principal purpose of these laws is to shield from the employer
information about criminal history, genetic information, or disability status:
asking about any of those things is itself a violation of the act. Most of these
laws also contain restrictions on finding out about these factors by other means.22
These laws also back up this attempt to keep the information from the employer
with a prohibition on relying on the factor to make an employment decision if

15. As Professor Sullivan points out, at most it would be a violation of Title VII for an
employer to ask about a prohibited category (or a related characteristic such as marital plans or
plans for children) only if the employer asked only one race or gender and, even if that was the
case, it would not be a violation unless an adverse action were taken based on the response. Charles
A. Sullivan, The Unintended Consequences of Putting Family Off-Limits in Job Searches, JOTWELL
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://worklaw.jotwell.com/the-unintended-consequences-of-putting-family-offlimits-in-job-searches. Title VII does not have a provision equivalent to the direct bans on asking
in the ADA or the salary-ban or ban-the-box laws. But it should be noted that there is a difference
between a formal ban on transparency and a custom of non-transparency that arises out of a ban on
reliance. See infra Section II. A.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
18. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
19. See supra note 4.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (making it illegal for an employer to “request, require, or
purchase” an employee’s genetic information).
21. Under the ADA, an employer inquiry about whether an applicant is an individual with a
disability is a form of discrimination prohibited by the Act. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). As
discussed later, the ADA prohibits reliance on an individual’s disability in cases alleging disparate
treatment but requires reliance on disability in reasonable accommodation cases. See infra notes
122-24.
22. For example, most of the ban-the-box laws also limit background checks, see supra note
4, and the ADA limits medical exams in addition to inquiries about disability status. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(d)(1).
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non-transparency fails and the employer learns about it. It is usually illegal
under these laws to rely on criminal history, genetic information, or (sometimes)
disability status to make an employment decision.
Quadrant three––high transparency on factors the employer can rely on––
covers most of employment law and a few antidiscrimination laws. Unless
prohibited (and most things are not prohibited), an employer can ask anything
and can rely on anything in making an employment decision.23 Juli Briskman
was fired for gesturing disrespectfully at a Presidential motorcade.24 Janet
Brunner was fired for volunteering at the AIDS Foundation.25 James Scroghan
was fired for going to law school.26 Rudy Hillenbrand was fired for discovering
that his boss was having an affair.27 All of these employment decisions were
legal. The employer could ask about them and could rely on them in making an
employment decision, even if wrong-headed and irrational.28
But quadrant three also includes laws that are part of the antidiscrimination
effort. Recent efforts by the EEOC,29 and private groups like Glassdoor,30 are
intended to bring salary data into the sunlight.31 These initiatives focus on
transparency and do not have any direct bans on employer reliance on the data.
Indeed, the initiatives are almost the opposite of a ban on use of the information:
a primary purpose of the transparency is to encourage reliance on the salaries
disclosed. More subtly, accommodation statutes like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and recent state pregnancy laws may fit into this
23. In the United States, this result is a byproduct of employment at will and weak privacy
protections. This is not the case everywhere. In Germany, for example, employers are restricted
in making inquiries about salary based on general privacy concerns; there, salary-ban statutes would
be largely superfluous. See Matthew W. Finkin, Pay Privacy in Comparative Context, 22 EMP.
RTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 368, 378 (2018) (“In Germany, out of concern for employee privacy the
employer bears the burden to prove [that a question about salary] is necessary under a strict standard
of relatedness to job qualification.”).
24. Amanda Holpuch, Woman Who Gave Trump the Finger Elected in Virginia, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/06/julibriskman-trump-middle-finger-wins-office-virginia. She was later elected to the county board of
supervisors. Id.
25. Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784, 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
26. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
27. Hillenbrand v. City of Evansville, 457 N.E.2d 236, 236−37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
28. These results are a function of the ubiquity of the default rule of at-will employment in
the United States. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 2.01 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
29. See supra note 5.
30. See GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
Glassdoor is a job-placement website that collects and publicizes salary reports for many job
categories and from a wide variety of companies.
31. Ironically, given the salary-ban statutes, a number of academics have argued for almost
the opposite legal response: high transparency about pay rather than low transparency. See, e.g.,
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay
Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 951, 952 (2011); Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for
Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 781 (2014); Gowri
Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN STATE L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2012).
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category. The accommodation obligation arises only when there is transparency,
that is, when the employer knows of a disability or pregnancy.32 When the
employer knows, there is almost the opposite of non-reliance: the employer must
rely on the factor to try to accommodate it.33 Finally, although maybe on the
edge of the “discrimination law” category, the immigration laws require
employers to ask about work status and require them to rely on the information.
That is, employers must require new employees to complete an I-9 form
confirming the employee’s authority to work in the United States and requires
an employer to rely on the form to permit work to commence or to withdraw the
offer of employment.34
Quadrant four––low transparency on factors the employer can rely on––
includes most of the recent salary-ban laws and many of the ban-the-box laws.35
The main feature of both these sets of laws is to keep information away from the
employer: it is illegal for an employer to ask about prior salary or criminal
history.36 But many of these laws do not bar the employer from relying on the
information if they know it. A famous, or maybe infamous, use of this quadrant
was the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” rules initially implemented during the Clinton
administration.37
In sum, even though transparency and reliance are not often mentioned as
central features of antidiscrimination laws, every law makes choices on these
two dimensions explicitly or implicitly, and the choices vary. Indeed, the
choices are varied enough to have laws fit into each of the four possible
categories on the two dimensions.

32. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“[Employer must make] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . .”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Kobus v. Coll. of St. Scholastica, Inc., 608
F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the employer did not violate the ADA by failing
to accommodate absenteeism when employer was unaware that a disability contributed to the
absences).
33. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See, e.g., Holly v. Clairson Indus., 492 F.3d 1247,
1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he very purpose of reasonable accommodation laws is to require
employers to treat disabled individuals differently in some circumstances.”). Another example may
be laws restricting private agreements not to disclose bad information, such as sexual harassment
allegations. These laws increase transparency by barring private agreements to maintain nontransparency; the laws clearly intend to permit and facilitate employer reliance on the information,
once disclosed. See generally, Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Confidential Settlements in the
#MeToo Era, 54 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 517, 517−18 (2020) (reporting that at least twelve states have
enacted statutes that limit the ability to maintain the confidentiality of sexual harassment
allegations).
34. Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
35. See supra notes 1, 4.
36. Even though these laws restrict speech, they are unlikely to violate the First Amendment.
For a good discussion, see Helen Norton, Discrimination, the Speech That Enables It, and the First
Amendment, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 209 (2020).
37. See JODY FEDER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40795, “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (2013).
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B. The Transparency Continuum
Although the prior section treated transparency as dichotomous, it is actually
a continuum that goes from must disclose to cannot ask, with lots of variation
across the entire continuum. The variation includes differences between
different types of information and differences in when information must or can
be solicited by an employer.
On the “must disclose” side of the continuum, some laws require employers
to disclose information. For example, the EEOC requires employers to disclose
salary information.38 Interestingly, the disclosures of individual employers are
confidential,39 so they are clearly intended to assist the agency in enforcing the
law (and to deter employers who know the enforcement agency has the
information), but not to inform employees about their employer’s salary
practices.40 Recently, however, the EEOC released a tool that permits anyone
to explore some of the data in aggregate form; employees still will not be able
to access their own employer’s data, but they will be able to develop comparative
data to assist them in evaluating their own treatment.41 In contrast, a number of
other laws require disclosures to be made that are intended to inform employees
and the public about their particular employer’s labor-related practices, such as
the securities laws,42 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,43 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.44
Also close to the “must disclose” side of the continuum, employers must ask
about, and may require, certain information. For example, they must ask about
immigration status and social security numbers. These two differ, however, on
the timing of the request. Federal law requires the employer to verify that the
worker has an immigration status that permits work,45 but prohibits making the
inquiry until after a job offer is made.46 For social security numbers, employers
38. See supra note 5. The SEC has a similar disclosure requirement, although it does not fall
as squarely within the category of an antidiscrimination statute. See supra note 5.
39. Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 45,479, 45,491−92 (July 14,
2016).
40. Id. at 45,491 (noting that the salary data will be used only by EEOC staff for training and
to assess charges of discrimination and for aggregated reports).
41. EEOC Launches New Data Tool to Track Employment Trends, EEOC (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-launches-new-data-tool-track-employment-trends.
42. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015) (requiring the
information to be included in public filings and indicating that the primary purpose is to inform
shareholders).
43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–25 (requiring disclosure
of pension and health care information).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2020) (requiring employers to post notice explaining the requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
45. Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (requiring employer to
verify eligibility to work).
46. See Pre-Employment Inquiries and Citizenship, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/preemployment-inquiries-and-citizenship (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
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must also ask and, while it is good practice to ask only after a job offer has been
made, no restriction exists on asking earlier.47
On the “cannot ask” side of the continuum, several laws prohibit an employer
from asking or obtaining certain restricted information, but most of them have
exceptions tailored to the basic prohibition. The exceptions take one or both of
two forms. First, the laws do not apply the prohibition in circumstances where
the information is particularly necessary or useful. For example, some of the
ban-the-box laws make an exception for fiduciary positions or positions
involving public safety.48 Similarly, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA) permits an employer to obtain and use genetic information in
connection with a wellness program, a request for leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, or a program to monitor toxic substances in the workplace.49
The other type of exception is timing. Despite the general prohibition, the laws
often permit an inquiry at certain points in time. The ADA, for example, permits
inquiries about disability status after an offer of employment has been made,
under certain conditions.50 And GINA, as noted above, permits an inquiry about
genetics if relevant to a request under the Family and Medical Leave Act.51
Most information falls between these extremes on the transparency
continuum: between information that must be disclosed and information that
cannot be disclosed. But considerable variation exists in this part of the
continuum too. As part of an employment-at-will regime, broadly construed,
employers can ask about any information not prohibited and employees can offer
any information. It matters not whether the information is relevant to a decision
to be made, or completely extraneous, or even frivolous.52 But despite this
general rule, some laws have important effects on transparency. For example,
several states do not permit private agreements to keep sexual harassment
allegations confidential. The information is not required to be disclosed, but it
cannot be kept secret either, even by private agreement.53 Similarly, laws
requiring accommodation effectively require employees to disclose information.
47. See Hiring Employees, IRS (June 27, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/hiring-employees; Can Employers Request an Applicant’s Social
Security Number on an Employment Application?, SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/Resources
AndTools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/Pages/socialsecuritynumber.aspx (last visited July 3, 2022).
48. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(7)(ii) (2021); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/15(b)(2) (2021)
(both permitting the question when a fidelity bond is required for the position and a conviction
would preclude obtaining one); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B–16(a) (West 2015); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 750(5) (McKinney 2014).
49. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(b).
50. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
51. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(b)(3).
52. See Alison Doyle, Weird Interview Questions and How to Answer Them, THE BALANCE
CAREERS (May 29, 2021), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/top-weird-interview-questions-205
9482 (reporting interview questions such as “Pick a color, red or blue?” and “how many pizzas are
ordered every night in the United States?”).
53. Kotkin, supra note 33, at 519–22.
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An employer has an obligation to accommodate a disability or pregnancy only
if the employer knows of the condition.54 Thus, while the employee is not
required to disclose the information and, indeed, has a right to keep it secret, a
powerful legal incentive exists to tell the employer.
C. The Reliance Continuum
The reliance continuum also has wide variation from must rely to many
varieties of cannot rely. As with transparency, most factors fit between these
two extremes, but great variety exists throughout the continuum.
On the must-rely side, employers must inquire into and rely on immigration
status. This must-rely obligation is one sided. That is, if the worker is not
authorized to work in the United States, the employer must rely on that status
not to employ the worker.55 On the other hand, if the worker is authorized to
work in the United States, the obligation flips to a form of must not rely. For
these workers, employers cannot rely on citizenship or national origin in hiring
or firing.56
Also on the must-rely side of the continuum, employers must rely on known
protected statuses when they are under a duty to accommodate. Employers must
accommodate and, thus, must rely on religion under Title VII,57 disability under
the ADA,58 or, increasingly, pregnancy under state or local laws.59 An employer
that fails to take the status into consideration at all, violates the interactiveprocess requirement of the accommodation duty,60 and maybe the
accommodation duty itself.61
The cannot-rely side of the continuum is populated by all the standard
antidiscrimination obligations. The list can be long. My personal favorite is the
54. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“[Employers must make] reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”)
(emphasis added).
55. Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)(A).
56. Id. at § 1324b(a)(1). Although the general rule is that employers cannot rely on citizenship
in hiring and firing for employees authorized to work in the United States, employers can rely on
citizenship to break a tie between equally qualified candidates. Id. at § 1324b(a)(4).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
58. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
59. See Pregnancy Accommodations in the States, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., at 1 (July 2017),
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Pregnancy-Accommodations-in-the-States-July2017.pdf (reporting that twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring
accommodation of pregnancy).
60. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) (2022) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive
process . . . .”).
61. It is probably the case that the interactive-process duty is violated only if a reasonable
accommodation might have been discovered through the process; if no reasonable accommodation
was possible, a bare violation of the process duty is probably not an independent violation of the
ADA. See Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 293−94 (7th Cir. 2015); McBride v.
BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Madison, Wisconsin, nondiscrimination ordinance. In Madison, an employer
making an employment decision cannot rely on:
sex, race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry, citizenship status,
age, handicap/disability, marital status, source of income, arrest
record, conviction record, less than honorable discharge, physical
appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic identity,
political beliefs, familial status, student status, domestic partnership
status, receipt of assistance, unemployment, or status as a victim of
domestic abuse, sexual assault, or stalking . . . .62
The precise nature of the cannot-rely ban is variable and one of the most
debated issues in discrimination law. Sometimes, but not always, the ban
includes non-intentional disparate impacts, as well as intentional
discrimination.63 Sometimes it requires but-for causation, but at other times
not.64 These are important distinctions, but they are not the focus of this article.
For the purposes of this article, these distinctions are relatively minor variations
that all fall well within the cannot-rely category.
But as with transparency, most factors an employer might rely on fall between
the two extremes of must rely and cannot rely. Again, the United States is mostly
an employment-at-will regime, so employers can rely on any factor not
prohibited in making an employment decision, even immaterial and silly ones.
But, of course, the cannot-rely factors cast a shadow over this otherwise sunny
pasture (or a few rays of sunlight on this cloudy day?). Most significantly, the
disparate impact doctrine can convert neutral factors into prohibited ones. Part
of the paradox of disparate impact is that it does this conversion. The doctrine
requires the analysis to begin with a neutral, non-banned factor but, when the
overlap with a banned factor is too great, neither the neutral factor nor the banned
62. MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 39.03(1) (2022), https://library.municode.com
/wi/madison/codes/code_of_ordinances; see also § 39.03(2)(mm).
For employment
discrimination, the ordinance generally follows Title VII’s low transparency/no reliance model. Id.
at § 39.03(8)(a), (b) (tracking the language of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(1)–(2)). However, the ordinance does contain a number of adjustments for particular
protected statuses. See infra note 132.
63. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425–426, 436 (1971) (holding that the
disparate impact of employment tests that cannot predict job performance are a violation under
Title VII); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (holding that recovery for disparate
impact claims are authorized under the ADEA); but see, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390–91 (2002) (concluding that disparate impact claims are not
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 233, 238–39, 246 (1976)
(holding that disparate impact claims are not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
64. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (holding but-for
causation is required under an ADEA disparate-treatment claim); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding but-for causation is required for retaliation cases under
Title VII); but see Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (stating that but-for
causation is not required for race, color, religion, sex and national origin, as proof that the status
was a motivating factor is sufficient); Uniform Services Employment & Reemployment Rights Act,
38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (same for discrimination on the basis of service in the uniformed services).
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factor can be used (absent business necessity). The conversion takes place on a
sliding scale⎯some overlap is acceptable, but not too much⎯and the neutral
factor might be banned even if the employer did not know about the overlap and
did not intend at all to use it nefariously.65
II. THINKING ABOUT THE CATEGORIES
Even though reliance and transparency are quite variable, it is useful to think
about them as distinct categories. Thinking about the four quadrants produced
by distinct categories can tell us something about discrimination law that we
don’t see otherwise.
A. Formal Categories and Practical Realities
Formally, quadrants one and four are quite distinct. Quadrant one (high
transparency on factors that an employer cannot rely on) stands in sharp contrast
to quadrant four (no transparency on factors that an employer can rely on). Title
VII is different than the salary-history bans. But the two may be more similar
than appears at first glance. Indeed, despite these formal differences, in practice
the two may begin to resemble each other.
Consider quadrant one. First, Title VII has no prohibition against asking about
any of the prohibited categories, for example about gender or gender-related
issues, such as pregnancy or childcare.66 When Congress wants to have a
prohibition on transparency, it knows how to do that as it did in the ADA and
GINA.67 It did not do that in Title VII. An employer may even ask only female
applicants, and not males, about gender and gender-related issues, so long as the
employer does not rely on them in making an employment decision. An

65. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (explaining that an adverse
employer intention is not required to prove disparate impact discrimination). A discussion of
application of the transparency/reliance matrix to disparate impact is outside the scope of this paper.
The relationship between the two is far from clear in large part because the underlying theory of
disparate impact has always been obscure. See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW
THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 105–06
(1972); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971);
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73
VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298–99 (1987); Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2017); Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of
Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1985).
66. See Questions and Answers About the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy
Discrimination and Related Issues, EEOC (June 25, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
guidance/questions-and-answers-about-eeocs-enforcement-guidance-pregnancy-discriminationand (“Title VII does not prohibit employers from asking applicants or employees about genderrelated characteristics such as pregnancy . . . .”).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b).
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employer needs to take an adverse employment action to violate Title VII.68
Merely asking is not a cognizable adverse action.
But the conventional wisdom is that employers cannot ask about these things.
We have all heard this in training sessions from human resources offices.69 So
why is this? One reason is that merely asking increases the risk of a
discrimination lawsuit. Why ask if you’re not going to use it? Doesn’t asking
imply that you’re going to use it? Distrust of agents is another explanation.
Nuanced rules are difficult to convey and enforce, and “you can ask but don’t
rely on the answer” is a nuanced rule. A cleaner rule––don’t ask––is easier to
convey to an employer’s hiring agents, and easier to enforce internally.70
But for our purposes, note that a widespread practice like this effectively
converts a law that formally falls into quadrant one into a quadrant two law, that
is, from a high transparency/cannot rely law into a low transparency/cannot rely
law. Although still not formally a quadrant two law, it effectively becomes one.
In a similar move, quadrant four laws may move in the direction of quadrant
one. Certainly, the theory and goal of quadrant four laws is that the covered
factor will not be relied on. The theory is that, if the employer does not know of
the factor because non-transparency is effective, then the employer cannot rely
on it. Consequently, if completely successful, a quadrant four law also moves
into quadrant one: transparency is forbidden, therefore reliance is blocked.
B. Why Quadrant Four?
Why is there ever a viable legislative choice between quadrant two and four?
If the factor is disfavored, why not prohibit both transparency and reliance?
Why prohibit only transparency? The answer highlights the underlying
assumptions of the two quadrants.
Quadrants one and two are based on the idea that the factors are always
invidious and, correspondingly, always irrelevant to employment decisions.
This is a case where the exception proves the rule. Laws in these quadrants
68. See, e.g., AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 645 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that there
was no Title VII violation when the plaintiff only suffered petty slights or minor annoyances);
Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding
that there was no adverse action from required factfinding sessions, threats of termination, and
switch from day to night shift). See generally Esperanza N. Sanchez, Analytical Nightmare: The
Materially Adverse Action Requirement in Disparate Treatment Cases, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 575,
578 (2018).
69. For examples of such advice, see, e.g., Illegal Interview Questions and Female
Applicants, FINDLAW (Dec. 10, 2018), https://employment.findlaw.com/hiring-process/illegalinterview-questions-and-female-applicants.html; How to Ask Legal Interview Questions,
MONSTER,
https://hiring.monster.com/employer-resources/recruiting-strategies/interviewingcandidates/legal-job-interview-questions.
70. Of course, there are good reasons to ask that are lost when employers have a flat ban on
asking about these topics. For example, if an employer’s relative advantage in the labor market is
good public schools and childcare, failing to ask about children makes it more difficult to present
these advantages to candidates.
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almost always have a narrow exception––the bona fide occupational
qualification exception (“BFOQ”)––to permit the factor to be used, but only in
the narrowest of circumstances.71 For example, on paper (but not in practice),
Title VII permits all of the factors, except race, to be used if the occupation
requires it. When in the labor market for sperm donors or wet nurses, employers
can discriminate against women and men, respectively. But Title VII’s BFOQ
exception does not apply to race.72 By its terms, Title VII views race as always
invidious, always irrelevant.
But even race is not always completely irrelevant. It seems (and is) legitimate
for a police captain to rely on race to select someone to infiltrate a White
supremacist gang.73 Nor does it seem problematic for the director of a realistic
biopic of Martin Luther King Jr. to rely on race to select the central figure.74
Similarly, employers may be permitted, or even required, to take race into
account to correct for past discrimination or long-standing racial disparities.75
This tells us that the invidious/irrelevant presumption in the language of Title
VII is to be taken seriously but not literally. The seeming (but not) absolute bar
may serve an expressive function even more than a strictly positive one.76
Quadrant four is based on a different underlying assumption: that the factor is
usually irrelevant and produces problematic social outcomes (such as fewer job
opportunities for women or individuals with disabilities), but it is not always
invidious and, thus correspondingly, it is sometimes relevant to employment
decisions. Indeed, for the ADA, the assumption is that at some points in the
employment process, the factor is central to employment decisions and must be
relied on to facilitate fair employment outcomes. Similarly, for past-salary
information, the limits on transparency are intended to limit the adverse effect
on women who, because of gender-related pay disparities, are disproportionately
71. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
72. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (providing an exception for bona fide occupational
qualifications only for religion, sex, and national origin).
73. Broadway’s “Hamilton” Teaches Lessons to Employers, FISHER PHILLIPS (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-broadways-hamilton-teacheslessons-to-employers-1 (noting that Title VII does not prohibit using race to set up sting operation
for a White supremacist gang).
74. The musical Hamilton provides a recent example. The casting call for the musical
specifically sought “non-white men and women” for lead roles. Although never litigated, the
practice was widely viewed as acceptable as a bona fide occupational qualification since one of the
central messages of the musical depended on non-white actors. See Nicole Ligon, Who Tells Your
Story: The Legality of and Shift in Racial Preferences Within Casting Preferences, 26 WM. &
MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 135, 135 (2019).
75. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 154 (1987) (permitting court-ordered remedies requiring
employers to grant racial preferences to correct for past discrimination); United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 442 U.S. 193, 197 (1979); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 (1987)
(permitting voluntary race-conscious affirmative action programs to correct for past, long-standing
discrimination).
76. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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likely to present lower comparative salary information. But the salary-ban laws
do not want to prohibit the minority of women with higher-than-offered salaries
from bargaining for higher pay with that information. They want that
information to be transparent and to permit employers to rely on it.
In sum, the assumptions underlying skepticism about use of the factors
explain why a legislature might choose a quadrant four approach rather than a
quadrant one or two approach. If the assumption is that the factor is generally
problematic, but nevertheless sometimes relevant and legitimate (more often
than would be permitted by a stringent bona fide occupational qualification
exception), it might choose quadrant four instead of quadrant one or two.
C. Why Quadrant One?
The discussion above raises the converse question: If it is (almost) always
improper to rely on the invidious factor, then why permit the employer to ask
about it? Why not prohibit transparency as well as reliance? Why place a
prohibition into quadrant one when quadrant two (no reliance and low
transparency) would do an even more thorough job?
Ironically, this question may have an answer analogous to the “why quadrant
four” question but focused on the other party to the negotiation. For quadrant
four, reliance is permitted because, although the information presents problems,
it can also be used positively in the antidiscrimination effort. We want to permit
employers to rely on salary history when women have higher salaries so that the
reliance might help address (rather than detract from) the problem of unequal
wages. We want employers to rely on disability status when accommodations
permit the individual to perform job duties.
For quadrant one, the idea is also that the information is useful, but to the other
party to the negotiation, that is, to the prospective employee. Although an
employer cannot rely on gender or gender-related topics such as pregnancy and
childcare in making an employment decision, discussion of them may help the
employment matching process. By discussing childcare options or a generous
leave policy, employers can openly signal that they provide a work environment
conducive to women and it can help women sort into jobs that better meet their
preferences. A barrier on frank discussion of these topics would interfere with
the sorting process to the detriment of both employers and workers. Thus again,
while an employer cannot rely on these factors, transparency permits
communication on them; it improves the efficiency of the labor market, of the
matching process.
Note that this permitted transparency helps “good” employers and hurts “bad”
employers, while non-transparency would do the reverse. Good employers want
to be able to inquire freely into the preferences of employees on gender-related
matters so that they can signal their “goodness.” Bad employers would rather
avoid the issues. In this way, transparency also provides some incentive to
invest in and provide a work environment attentive to these kinds of issues. If
employers could not talk about the work environment, good employers would
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not be able to reap the full benefits of their investments in good leave programs,
good child-care options, and the like.
D. Why Quadrant Three?
Quadrant three––high transparency on factors an employer can rely on––
includes most things an employer might rely on in making an employment
decision. But the interesting question for this paper is why would this choice
ever be used as part of the antidiscrimination effort? Why would it apply to
factors that employers are generally discouraged from using, such as salary,
disability, or pregnancy?
The key factor here is that, even though the factor can be used improperly, it
also has proper uses. An employer who wants to attract an employee needs to
know if its offer is too low; similarly, an employee who wants to work for that
employer wants to give the employer an opportunity to beat her current salary.
For disability or pregnancy, the obligation of an employer to accommodate can
be meaningful only if the employer knows about the disability or pregnancy.
Interestingly, in contexts like these, transparency itself may be a positive good;
people tend to look more favorably on transparent processes than on opaque
ones.77
When a factor, such as salary or disability, can be used properly or improperly,
a ban on its use would ban proper as well as improper uses. More particularly
to transparency, if a factor can be used properly, a ban on asking about it is likely
to be ineffective or even counter-productive. When employers and employees
both have incentives to disclose the information, they will often find ways to
discover or disclose the information indirectly, even if they are prohibited from
discussing it directly.78 As a result, factors may fall into this category when the
information can be used legitimately and illegitimately, and the legitimate uses
make it reasonable to permit the employer to discover and use the information
in many situations.
E. Problems with Non-Transparency
Non-transparency as a nondiscrimination strategy has two big problems.
First, true non-transparency is often difficult and, second, even if possible,
hiding a factor may perversely activate unconscious biases.
Sometimes non-transparency is possible and sometimes it is not. This factor–
–the possibility of non-transparency––is an important one differentiating
77. See BRIAN CHRISTIAN, THE ALIGNMENT PROBLEM: MACHINE LEARNING AND HUMAN
VALUES 319 (2020) (finding people place greater trust in transparent computer models even when
the models are wrong and ought not to be trusted).
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. Professor Cofone provides an insightful
discussion of this issue noting that legal limits on access to information an employer views as
relevant to an employment decision may be avoided by asking about the subject indirectly (thus,
increasing the time and cost of the hiring process) or by using proxies for the information (which
can be done efficiently by algorithm). Cofone, supra note 3, at 174-75.
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between laws that do and do not require it. Past salary and criminal convictions,
for example, are not evident a priori to employers. On the other hand, race and
gender are usually evident even if employers are forbidden from asking about
them.79 Disability falls in between; some disabilities are obvious, others hidden.
More abstractly, the effectiveness of transparency depends on the unavailability
of proxies. If proxies are available, to be effective, the rule would also have to
ban proxies. But because modern technology is very adept at finding proxies,
producing effective non-transparency is increasingly difficult.80 In the extreme
case, if non-transparency is impossible (the factor is readily observable), then a
non-transparency rule is futile. In that case, if a problem with the factor is to be
addressed, it must be addressed in another way, for example, by prohibiting
reliance on it.
But even if non-transparency seems possible, it may be difficult to enforce.
Consider the situation in which employers cannot ask about a factor, say salary,
but they can rely on it if they know about it, for example, if the employee
volunteers the information.
Consider this analogy. Each of one hundred sellers of apples (employees
selling labor) has a box containing one to one hundred apples; each apple is
worth one dollar. The sellers know how many apples they have in their box and
the purchaser (employer) knows the seller knows, but the purchaser cannot ask
a seller how many apples are in a box. What would a seller with 100 apples in
her box do in this situation? She knows the purchaser won’t offer her $100
without disclosure because the odds are that she doesn’t have 100 apples in her
box. So, she discloses. Now there are only boxes with one to ninety-nine apples.
What does the seller with ninety-nine apples do? Then the seller with ninetyeight apples, with ninety-seven apples, and so forth. This is unraveling. In
theory, at the end of the day all the sellers will disclose their private information.
In the employment context, even if all the sellers (of labor) do not disclose, the
employer can and probably will make inferences about those that do not. A
“can’t ask” rule is likely to be ineffective unless there is also a rule against
voluntary disclosure.81
This unraveling story illustrates one reason non-transparency is difficult even
for non-evident factors. On salary, for example, if an employer offers an initial
salary, the employer would expect a prospective employee to voluntarily
disclose current salary if it is more than the offer. This expectation means that,

79. Obviously, employers can take steps to withhold this information from decision-makers,
for example, by not including it on the application form, prohibiting photographs, etc. Cf. Timothy
Williams, To Avoid Bias, Prosecutors Try Hiding a Suspect’s Race When Filing Charges, N.Y.
TIMES June 12, 2019, at A15. But that strategy is only possible at some stages of employment (for
example, it is difficult to implement for decisions about current employees) and it depends on the
unavailability of proxies. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
80. See Cofone, supra note 3, at 151.
81. This example is adapted from DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
89–95 (1994).
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if an employer cannot ask about current salary, it has an incentive to low-ball
the initial salary to encourage voluntary disclosure of current salary. Given this
structure, it is possible that a law limiting employer inquiries about salaries may
cause more low-ball initial offers and, consequently, result in lower salaries than
a more open system where salary expectations are discussed freely and openly.82
A stronger non-transparency rule may also produce perverse outcomes.
Consider a non-transparency rule that is coupled with a no-reliance rule: the
employer cannot ask and cannot rely on the factor. Recent studies indicate that
this may result in worse outcomes for the intended beneficiaries of the rules
because it may activate adverse reactions. For example, it may be that the
absence of information activates unconscious biases.
In a leading study, Professors Agan and Starr examined callback rates before
and after enactment of ban-the-box laws. Before the ban-the-box laws, White
applicants received twenty-three percent more callbacks than Black applicants
with similar resumes. And, as expected, employers who asked about criminal
records were very significantly more likely to callback applicants who did not
have criminal records (sixty-three percent more likely), a form of discrimination
that the no-transparency obligation of the ban-the-box laws eliminated. But the
overall effect of the ban-the-box laws’ non-transparency was to increase the
disadvantage of Black applicants. Before ban-the-box when employers asked
about criminal records, White applicants received seven percent more callbacks
than similar Black applicants; after ban-the-box White applicants received fortyfive percent more callbacks than similar Black applicants from those
employers.83 In essence, the studies find that the benefits of a ban-the-box law
for Blacks with convictions are outweighed by the disadvantages for Blacks

82. See Jeff Meli & James C. Spindler, Salary History Bans & Gender Discrimination, PUB.
L. & LEGAL THEORY RSCH. PAPER SERIES NO. E587, 6 (2019) (finding that bans on salary history
information inhibit information about worker productivity and, consequently, adversely affect high
performing women thus aggravating the wage gap); but see James Bessen et al., Perpetuating
Inequality: What Salary History Bans Reveal About Wages, B. U. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY PAPER
NO. 20-19, 26–29 (2020) (finding that salary history bans increase wages by five percent on
average, with higher increases for women and African-Americans); Moshe A. Barach & John J.
Horton, How Do Employers Use Compensation History?: Evidence From a Field Experiment,
NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 26627, 31–32 (2020) (finding from an experiment that workers
benefited from salary-ban laws); Benjamin Hansen & Drew McNichols, Information & the
Persistence of the Gender Wage Gap: Early Evidence from California’s Salary History Ban, NBER
WORKING PAPER NO. 27054 (2020) (finding that California’s salary-ban statute reduced the gender
wage gap by one percent).
83. Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination:
A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECONOMICS 191, 195 (2018); see also Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin
Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of “Ban the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories are Hidden, 38 J. LAB. ECON. 321, 352 (2020)
(finding ban-the-box laws decrease the probability of employment for young, low-skilled Black
men by 5.1 percent); but see Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1079, 1079–180 (2019) (reporting on an empirical study which found that a ban-the-box law
increased callbacks for all races, with the biggest increase for Black applicants).
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without convictions. When the latter are prohibited from declaring that they are
conviction-free, a form of statistical discrimination, stereotyping bias,
mistakenly scars them.
This possibility is not restricted to African-Americans, ban-the-box, or
stereotyping. Professors Hirsch and Shinall have found that the hiring prospects
of female applicants decline when they conceal personal information about their
personal and family situation. The professors attribute this result to another form
of behavioral heuristic: ambiguity aversion. Individuals tend to prefer known
risks to unknown ones; disclosure of personal and family information reduces
uncertainty and, as a result, improves the prospects for candidates who disclose
the information.84 Thus, as with the ban-the-box studies, this result indicates
that non-transparency requirements or customs that prevent disclosure of
unfavorable information may perversely result in worse outcomes than if the
information were made available.85
In sum, non-transparency laws face two types of practical problems. First, if
they prohibit employers from asking about a factor but permit them to rely on it,
enforcing the non-transparency is difficult. Some kinds of factors, such as race
and gender, may be generally known even without asking. Moreover, even for
factors that are not as obvious, a form of unraveling may occur that incentivizes
disclosure, perhaps more disclosure than would occur without the limitation on
asking.86 Second, if the non-transparency laws prohibit both asking about and
relying on the factor, the limitation may activate unconscious biases that produce
worse outcomes for the intended beneficiaries.
III. DECIDING ON THE PROPER QUADRANT: THE CONSIDERATIONS
Transparency and reliance are already features of American
antidiscrimination law. Indeed, they have to be; they are a part of the basic
structure of antidiscrimination law. But decisions about where to place a
particular prohibition in the transparency/reliance matrix are not uniform; laws
currently exist that fall into each possible quadrant of transparency and
reliance.87 This means that decisions about placement are being made, but they
have been made implicitly without a framework for thinking about the proper
quadrant.

84. Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information Exchange
Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 86−87 (2016).
85. Interestingly, Professor Strahilevitz argues from this that information such as criminal
record histories should not be restricted. Making the information available to employers may
reduce the incidence of statistical discrimination. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus
Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 363–64 (2008).
86. A law that bans employers from asking about a factor, such as salary, signals to employees
that the information might be important to employers. As a result, employees might be more likely
to disclose the information voluntarily. Ironically, a ban like this would be most effective if
employers knew about it, but employees did not. See BAIRD, supra note 81, at 92.
87. See supra Part I.A.
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It would be better if decisions about transparency and reliance were made
explicitly and for good reasons. What kinds of considerations would lead to the
right placement in the matrix? In this section, I will describe the kinds of
considerations that ought to guide placement into a particular quadrant.
A. The Possibility of Non-Transparency
One variable is whether the low transparency half of the equation is even
possible, or possible enough to be a viable option. Non-transparency seems
mostly unattainable for some factors and some decisions. Race and gender, for
example, are difficult to shield effectively. Even without interviews, inferences
about these factors can be made from names and activities; the resume studies
indicate that these kinds of inferences are made.88 And even if non-transparency
can be achieved when some employment decisions are made, it may not be
possible at other times for other decisions. For example, with modern
technology, steps can be taken to shield race and gender at the hiring stage, even
with interviews. But similar shielding seems futile when decisions like pay
raises and promotions are made by supervisors about current employees.
On the other hand, low transparency seems quite possible for other factors.
Criminal history, for example, is not apparent absent employer inquiry or
investigation, and need not be apparent at any stage of employment.89
B. The Possibility of Non-Reliance
In some circumstances, non-reliance may be as difficult to enforce as nontransparency. A feature of implicit bias, for example, is conscious unawareness
of the phenomenon resulting in the discrimination; if the discriminator is
conscious of bias, it is no longer implicit. Viewed in this way, to require nonreliance on implicit bias presents a non sequitur; actors are being asked not to
rely on a factor of which they are unaware. While not presenting the seeming
impossibility of requiring non-reliance on implicit bias, other disfavored factors
may be difficult to define with the precision necessary to permit enforcement.
For example, actors may be aware of microaggressions, but identifying them

88. Both of these factors have become less dichotomized and more fractionalized in recent
years. Thus, this factor depends on the perception of transparency at the time of legislative
enactment, rather than transparency in some objective sense. See infra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text (discussing Title VII).
89. Many of the ban-the-box laws prohibit both employer inquiries about criminal history,
but also background checks and other employer attempts to obtain the information. See A Guide
to Ban the Box Laws at State County and City Levels. An Overview of Laws that May Impact
Private Employers, INTELLICORP, (Apr. 2021), https://www.intellicorp.net/marketing/IntelliCorp/
media/intellicorp/IntelliCorp-BanTheBoxGuide-Version-20-2021-docx.pdf.
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with sufficient precision to ban reliance, impose penalties, and determine
damages may be quite difficult.90
C. Legitimate Uses
Some factors have legitimate uses, even required uses. For others, the
legitimate uses are rare to non-existent. When accommodation of a factor is
required as is the case under the ADA and many state pregnancy statutes, the
employer must know about the factor to trigger the accommodation duty and
must rely on it to satisfy the duty. Even if reliance on the factor is not required,
some factors have well-accepted legitimate uses. It is well-accepted, for
example, that prospective employees should be able to disclose past salaries that
are higher than an employer’s offer, and that employers should be permitted to
rely on the past salary. On the other hand, one of the assumptions of the factors
covered by Title VII (except religion) is that employers rarely, if ever, have
legitimate reasons for relying on them. This is most apparent for race, which
lacks even a statutory basis for a bona fide use.91 But the BFOQ exception, even
when it applies, is intentionally narrow, in part to emphasize the limited
usefulness of the prohibited factors.
Non-transparency and non-reliance do not make sense for factors with
required uses. The required use signals as strongly as possible that there are
legitimate uses for the factors. Beyond that, a rough sliding scale exists:
disclosure and reliance become more acceptable (and can even be required) as
the legitimate uses for a factor increase.
D. Expressive Function
Not all law is coercive. Sometimes the law is intended to express social
norms.92 The no-reliance half of the matrix is coercive. But the other half may
or may not be coercive. The accommodation mandates that are in the can-rely
half are coercive; employers not only can-rely, they must rely on the factors. On
the other hand, the salary-ban acts in the can-rely half are not coercive;

90. The most-cited definition of microaggression is “brief and commonplace daily verbal,
behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate
hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or group.” D.W. Sue
et al., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM.
PSYCH. 271, 273 (2007). Placing microaggression on the no-reliance side of the quadrant would
be difficult because of problems identifying offending statements with sufficient precision, then
attempting to prove the statements caused an adverse outcome (since, by definition, they are
“micro”), and, even if both identification and causation were possible, to quantify the damages from
a violation.
91. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
92. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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employers cannot inquire about past salary, but they can rely if they become
aware by other means.
In the context of our matrix, the expressive function can be more or less
powerful. Forbidding reliance and transparency (quadrant two) would express
the most disapproval of a factor. On the other end of the continuum, permitting
reliance and high transparency (quadrant three) would signal that use of the
factor is acceptable. But there may be a function for a middle ground on
expressive function. In particular, permitting reliance but reducing (or even
requiring) transparency may signal disapproval of the factor in situations where
forbidding reliance may be difficult or impossible.93
E. Adaptation
Expected adaptation is another factor relevant to determining the appropriate
quadrant. As noted above, a quadrant one statute (forbidding reliance but
permitting transparency) may, in practice, turn into a quadrant two statute if
employers react by instructing agents not to ask about the prohibited factor.94
Similarly, a quadrant four statute (permitting reliance but limiting transparency),
if effective, may practically become a quadrant one statute if it effectively
prevents employers from learning about the factor.95
Although relevant, predicting adaptations is difficult. There is evidence, for
example, that the salary-ban statutes have caused employers to post salaries with
job advertisements more frequently.96 The effect of this on the goals of the
salary-ban statutes is ambiguous. It could mean employers are initially offering
lower salaries than earlier and, if accepted, the practice could result in lower jobchange salaries.97 Or it could be that posting salaries is an indication that
employers have accepted that the salary-ban statute removes most of the benefits
of wage bargaining and, with it, the incentive to keep the initial wage offer
secret.98 But even though adaptations and their effects may be difficult to
predict, the effectiveness of a statute in any quadrant will depend some on the
adaptive reactions of employers and workers.
F. Intended Audience
A major difference between the must-disclose and the cannot-disclose laws is
the intended audience. The intended audience of must-disclose laws, such as the

93. See infra notes 135-38.
94. See supra notes 66-70
95. See supra Part II.A, at 14.
96. See Bessen, et al., supra note 82.
97. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98. See Bessen, et al., supra note 82, at 29 (finding evidence that this is the reason for
increased posting of salaries, which resulted in wage increases, especially for women and minority
groups).
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harassment-settlement laws,99 and the salary-disclosure laws of the EEOC,100 is
the public. The idea is that disclosure of this information will protect workers
from potential harassment and improve the efficiency of the wage-setting
process. Perhaps the disclosures will even aid enforcement efforts by informing
employees of past harassment and wage disparities. On the other hand, the main
audience of the cannot-disclose laws is usually the employer. The idea is that
the information is irrelevant to employment decisions, while use of it adversely
impacts protected groups.
G. Timing
Timing is one way of dealing with the disjunction between transparency and
reliance. The ADA and salary-ban statutes limit transparency at one point in
time (before an offer of employment is made), but then permit transparency and
reliance later.101 Timing like this can permit a more fine-tuned calibration of the
relationship between transparency and reliance.
But timing has limitations. As a general matter, employment discrimination
laws apply to the full range of employment decisions, not only those that occur
at the hiring stage. Transparency limitations are likely to be less effective, or
even completely ineffective, for employment decisions made about current
employees. Employers have more ready access to information about current
employees; it is harder to erect information shields.
H. History
Related to expressive function, another consideration is the historical use of
the factor. Of course, since all these laws impose limitations, the history must
indicate worries about use in the past. But some histories are worse than others
and, thus, may call for stronger prohibitions.
History solved one of the problems early discrimination theorists worried
about. For example, Owen Fiss in his seminal piece on the theory of fair
employment laws justified them on the basis of lack of individual control and
unrelatedness to productivity. But if those are the reasons, Fiss asked, why
should the use of race and gender be banned, but not eye color, which also fits
both criteria? Fiss’s answer to this problem was historical use of the factor⎯the
widespread and unfair use of race and gender over time.102
Similarly, then, history may justify stronger measures within the
reliance/transparency matrix or point to less stringency. For example, race and
gender discrimination, with longer histories and which were deeply entrenched
in labor markets, may require a strong prohibition on reliance. On the other
hand, salary and criminal history have a less direct relationship to the identified
99.
100.
101.
102.

See supra note 53.
See supra note 5.
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d;); see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
See Fiss, supra note 65, at 242 n.11.
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problem (that is, they are related, but not precisely targeted to gender and race
discrimination) and a more mixed record of inappropriate use.103 Thus, they
may call for a lesser prohibition within the matrix.
IV. RE-THINKING THE PAST: APPLYING THE TRANSPARENCY/RELIANCE
MATRIX RETROACTIVELY
Lawmakers have always made decisions about transparency and reliance.
They are fundamental features of every antidiscrimination law. But the
decisions have been made implicitly, without direct consideration of the reasons
for placement within a particular quadrant of the matrix. This section compares
where antidiscrimination prohibitions have historically been placed in the
matrix, almost by happenstance, with where they would have been placed if the
matrix had been considered explicitly. Sometimes the placement makes sense;
sometimes less so.
A. Title VII: The Basic Approach
Title VII is the place to begin because it was the first major federal
antidiscrimination law and because it is the model for most of the state and local
laws. Most of those laws follow the Title VII model on transparency and
reliance and expand the substantive scope of the law simply by adding protected
categories to Title VII’s basic list.104 For example, the Madison, Wisconsin,
ordinance cited earlier prohibits discrimination on the Title VII factors, but then
adds nineteen other factors.105 This means that most state and local
antidiscrimination laws (and, hence, most antidiscrimination laws) fall into the
same quadrant as Title VII: quadrant one (no reliance and high transparency).
So, the first question to ask is whether quadrant one was the right placement
in the matrix for Title VII, or at least a justifiable placement. Title VII was
enacted mostly in response to a long history of extreme and explicit
discrimination against Blacks. Other types of discrimination were also
prohibited, of course, but the main impetus was discrimination against Blacks.
On the reliance side of the matrix, this history called for a strong expressive
statement against discrimination. As a result, both of these factors⎯history and
expressive function⎯pointed to placement of the act into one of the no-reliance
boxes of the matrix.

103. I do not mean to imply here that salary and criminal history have not been used in
problematic ways in the past, but rather simply that, compared to race and gender, they have more
appropriate uses.
104. They often also expand the procedural scope, for example, by increasing the number of
employers subject to the nondiscrimination requirements.
105. MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 39.03(2)(mm) (2022), https://library.muni
code.com/wi/madison/codes/code_of_ordinances.
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Title VII also envisioned few legitimate uses for the prohibited factors. The
BFOQ exception was extremely narrow, especially for race.106 And the
application of the prohibition was broad; it applied not only at hiring, but across
the entire spectrum of employment decisions. These two factors––few
legitimate uses and broad application––also point to placement in one of the noreliance boxes.
Non-reliance was also indicated because discrimination under Title VII was
defined in ways that were conducive to effective enforcement, or at least that is
how the courts interpreted the Act. Both major branches of discrimination relied
on a form of intention, either intentional use of a prohibited factor directly,107 or
intentional use of a neutral factor that had an adverse impact on a protected
group.108 Even when Title VII was extended to cover harassment, harassment
was defined in a way attentive to enforcement, for example, by requiring an
adverse effect on a tangible aspect of employment or, if not that, severe or
pervasive harassment.109 Title VII did not present either the reliance non
sequitur of implicit bias or the precision difficulties of microaggression.110
Finally, the intended audience of Title VII also points to placement in one of
the no-reliance boxes. The primary intended audience of Title VII is employers;
it is directed to regulating their conduct. Given that, it makes sense that the Act
takes the form of prohibiting reliance on the disfavored factors.
On transparency, at the time Title VII was enacted the possibility of nontransparency was probably thought to be limited. Even though “passing” was
known at the time,111 it was not thought to be widespread and current
appreciation of the variation of race and, especially, of gender was unheard of at
the time.112 Even today, the name/resume studies indicate that non-transparency
106. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
107. The two major sub-branches of intentional employment discrimination are individual
disparate treatment discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and systemic disparate treatment discrimination. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
108. The leading case on disparate impact discrimination is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
109. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751−54 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786−92 (1998).
110. See supra note 90 and accompanying text & infra note 133 and accompanying text.
111. See ALLYSON HOBBS, A CHOSEN EXILE: A HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN
LIFE (2014).
112. For example, the 1960 census included nine race, ethnicity, and origin categories, while
the 2020 census contained twenty categories, and for Whites and Blacks asks for additional
narrative explanation (such as German, Irish, Nigerian, or Somali). The census permitted
Americans to choose more than one racial category only since 2000. See What Census Calls Us,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/interactives/what-census-calls-us.
The modern conception of sex and gender that rejects a simple bipolar model and instead recognizes
many variations is generally dated from the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a good history, see
Kristina M. Zosuis et al., Gender Development Research in Sex Roles: Historical Trends & Future
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is difficult.113 The possibility-of-non-transparency factor, then, points to
placement in one of the high-transparency boxes of the matrix.
Similarly, the adaptation and timing factors point to placement in one of the
high transparency boxes. On adaptation, even with low transparency, employers
could make adaptations to frustrate low transparency. Many of the adaptations
were tried, such as photos on applications. Others, such as names on
applications and record-keeping for EEOC reporting, did not even require much
“adaptation.” On timing, Title VII provided a modest non-transparency rule that
indirectly emphasizes the general transparency rule. Title VII explicitly
prohibited race- and sex-segregated help-wanted advertisements.114 Thus, a
modest form of non-transparency was provided only at an early stage of the
hiring process when it might be effective. No similar non-transparency rule was
provided for any other stage of the employment process.
Thus, if Congress had thought about the transparency/reliance matrix when it
enacted Title VII (which it did not), it probably would have placed the act in
quadrant one––no-reliance and high transparency––which is where it was
placed, albeit based only on implicit reasoning.
B. Title VII: The Special Case of Religion
As originally enacted, religion was not treated differently than any of the other
prohibited factors: race, color, national origin, and sex.115 Thus, by default, it
was placed in quadrant one (no reliance, high transparency) alongside the other
factors. But it soon became apparent that there were problems on the reliance
side of that placement.

Directions, 64 SEX ROLES 826 (2011). For a good overview of current gender categories, see
Shelby Hanssen, Beyond Male or Female: Using Nonbinary Gender Identity to Confront Outdated
Notions of Sex and Gender in the Law, 96 ORE. L. REV. 283 (2017).
113. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily & Greg More
Employable than Lakisha & Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AMER. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
114. Title VII, § 704(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(b). Although the language of the statute was
clear and race-segregated help-wanted advertisements disappeared quickly, an extended debate
ensued about the legality of sex-segregated advertisements. In 1965, the EEOC issued its first
interpretive guidance on the issue which permitted sex-segregated advertisements under certain
conditions. By 1968, however, the EEOC reversed itself, interpreting the provision to prohibit
employers from using sex-segregated advertisements. Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham,
Now You See Them, Now You Don’t: The Legal Field and Newspaper Desegregation of SexSegregated Help Wanted Ads 1965-75, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 905, 913−14 (2006). Later, in
1973, the Supreme Court found analogous state and local restrictions that applied directly to
newspapers to be consistent with the First Amendment. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n
on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
115. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Congress exempted religious organizations from the ban
on religious discrimination. Id. § 2000e. As a result, that narrow category of employers would fit
into quadrant three (high transparency, may rely). This section discusses religious discrimination
as applied to the much broader category of employers not covered by the exemption.
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Soon after the Act’s effective date in 1965, the question arose whether it
would be impermissible religious discrimination for an employer to discharge
or refuse to hire a person who refused for religious reasons to work during the
employer’s normal work week.116 In 1966, the EEOC issued a guideline saying
that, for religion, the non-discrimination language of Title VII meant that
employers were required “to accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of
employees . . . where such accommodation can be made without serious
inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”117 The next year, the EEOC
revised the language of its guideline to state the accommodation requirement in
almost its modern form: employers must “make reasonable accommodations to
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such
accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”118
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court considered Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., a case in which a lower court had relied on the EEOC’s guidelines
to hold that it was permissible for an employer to discharge an employee for
refusing to work on Sundays for religious reasons when the employer had
provided the employee with the option of finding his own replacement.119
Uncertainties about how to apply the EEOC’s reasonable-accommodation
standard were very apparent when the Supreme Court was equally divided in the
case (with one Justice recusing himself). Consequently, the Court affirmed the
lower court decision without issuing an opinion.
Reasonable accommodation first entered American statutory law in 1972
when Congress tried to provide clarity after Dewey by amending Title VII to add
a definition of “religion”:120
The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer’s business.121
This was a significant change on the reliance side of the transparency/reliance
matrix. It recognized that, unlike the other Title VII factors for which there were
very few legitimate uses, there were sometimes legitimate reasons for an
116. This history is recited in the seminal Supreme Court case on religious discrimination
under Title VII. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
118. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968).
119. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971), aff’g 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
120. “This amendment is intended . . . to resolve by legislation . . . that which the courts
apparently have not resolved. I think it is needed . . . because court decisions have clouded the
matter with some uncertainty . . . .” 118 Cong. Rec. 705–06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
Sen. Randolph concluded his remarks by placing the Court of Appeals decision in Dewey into the
Congressional Record. Id. at 706.
121. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103.
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employer to rely on religion in making an employment decision. As a result,
instead of the (almost) always cannot-rely requirement of Title VII as originally
enacted, this change meant that religion was sometimes in the cannot-rely
quadrant one (for straight-up cases of disparate treatment religious
discrimination), but more commonly was in the must-rely quadrant three (for
cases when accommodation was required). Complete placement in the noreliance quadrant is not possible when reliance is sometimes required. On the
other hand, when a worker’s religious beliefs or practices do not require an
accommodation, a no-reliance rule makes sense.
Title VII, however, was not revised to change the transparency requirement.
As a result, religion remained, and still remains, on the high-transparency side
of the matrix. No restrictions exist on employer questions or inquiries about
religion. If Congress had been thinking about transparency, they may have made
a change on that side of the matrix, too. I have some confidence in saying this
because, as I detail below, they did make such a change in the other major federal
law requiring accommodation: the Americans with Disabilities Act.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act: Changing Transparency
Like Title VII, the ADA was enacted in response to a long history of
disadvantage suffered by workers in the labor market, in this case by individuals
with disabilities. This long history called for a law to express disapproval of
those labor market outcomes, even if some of the reasons for those outcomes
were understandable. That is, in contrast to the original Title VII, it was
recognized that there were legitimate uses for the disfavored factor that might
lead to labor market disadvantages––the factor could be relied on if
accommodation was difficult or imposed undue hardship. Indeed, the factor
must be relied on if accommodation was necessary to permit the individual to
perform the essential functions of the job.
This combination, as with religion under Title VII,122 pointed to a nuanced
position on the reliance side of the matrix. Complete placement in the no-

122. The evolution of the accommodation requirement for disability is similar to its evolution
for religion. The history begins with enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.), which prohibited discrimination on the
basis of “handicap” (as the phraseology was then): “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
. . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. at § 504.
In 1977, after some delay, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later
renamed the Department of Health and Human Services), the main federal enforcement agency for
the Rehabilitation Act, issued regulations to provide guidance about what non-discrimination in
this context meant and, as with religious discrimination, the conclusion was that non-discrimination
meant primarily a duty to accommodate: “[Under the Rehabilitation Act, covered entities must]
make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the [entity] can demonstrate that the
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reliance quadrant is not possible when reliance is sometimes required. On the
other hand, when the worker is fully qualified without accommodation, a noreliance rule makes sense.
On the transparency side, the ADA recognized that it is not always readily
apparent that a worker is a person with a disability. Some disabilities are
“hidden.”123 This meant that non-transparency was possible in at least a
substantial subset of cases involving individuals with disabilities. In general,
the possibility of non-transparency was most achievable at the application stage;
after employment, it was less likely that non-transparency could be maintained.
Finally, on adaptation, the ADA was an act in which adaptation was a positive
and required feature of the act. When employers learned of a disability, they
had an affirmative duty to adapt to, to accommodate, the disability. Thus, again,
the possibility of positive adaptation meant that transparency subtlety was
required. No transparency would mean that the expected, and indeed required,
adaptation could not occur.
Thus, if Congress had thought about the transparency/reliance matrix when
enacting the ADA (which it did not), it probably would have enacted a nuanced
position on both reliance and transparency. On reliance, it probably would have
prohibited reliance when the disability was irrelevant to the position, but
required reliance when accommodation was required. On transparency,
Congress probably would have limited transparency at certain times early in the
employment process when non-transparency was possible, but permitted
transparency later when reliance obligations came into place. And this is about
where the ADA came out. It is (mostly) a quadrant two law (no reliance and

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program or activity.” 42
Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,680 (May 4, 1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977).
Years later, this conception of non-discrimination for individuals with a disability was
incorporated into the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which had much broader
applicability. The statutory language was very similar to the administrative regulation under the
Rehabilitation Act:
[T]he term “discriminate” . . . includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business[.] 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Interestingly, however, the non-discrimination language of the Rehabilitation Act itself remains
substantively unchanged, as does the regulation implementing it. Thus, for both religion and
disability, development of the concept of reasonable accommodation began with a broad statement
that discrimination on that basis was illegal, which was interpreted by an administrative agency to
impose an accommodation requirement, which was later incorporated into statutory language.
123. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 934–36 (2003); Peter
David Blanck & Millie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369 (1997) (noting that the majority of
disability claims filed with the EEOC were for hidden disabilities).
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low transparency) except when it is a quadrant three law (must rely when there
is transparency).124
D. The Salary-Ban Laws
The salary-ban laws have been enacted mainly in response to long-standing
pay disparities between men and women and to a lesser extent between Whites
and racial minorities. Importantly, however, the laws are an indirect attack on
those disparities, rather than a direct attack. Laws already exist to prohibit salary
disparities that can be proven to be directly attributable to discrimination.125
Instead of doing that, these laws attempt to limit the opportunity to perpetuate
the disparities by limiting a category of information on which they might be
based. As a result, the history of improper use of salary, the disfavored factor,
is not as direct as the history of discrimination against Blacks and others
addressed by Title VII or individuals with disabilities addressed by the ADA.126
Similarly, the expressive function of the laws is less direct. The expressive
statement is not directly against pay discrimination against women and racial
minorities, but against the use of one factor that may be contributing to those
disparities. These factors point to a reliance standard that is weaker than that of
Title VII or the ADA.
The salary-ban laws also recognize that legitimate uses exist for past-salary
information. Women and racial minorities with higher-than-offered salaries
should be able to present past-salary information to negotiate for higher salaries.
Again, this points to a may-rely standard rather than a no-reliance standard.
On transparency, salary history is non-obvious and, thus, poses the possibility
of non-transparency. The possibility of non-transparency is enhanced as the
laws are directed at only one point in the employment process: the hiring stage.
Thus, if non-transparency is required only for that time, it may be both possible
and effective to limit improper use. Adaptation is a worry about nontransparency even at the hiring stage. As noted above, in response to a salaryban law, employers may post expected salaries more often and the incentive
would be to post lower-than-expected salaries to incentivize applicant selfdisclosure. There is some evidence that this has occurred.127 Interestingly,
although the salary-ban laws opt for limited transparency, this type of possible
adaptation may mean that high transparency would be a better option than low

124. “[E]mployers must treat individuals with disabilities equally if they are qualified and their
disabilities do not require accommodation, . . . [but] employers are required to treat such individuals
differently if reasonable accommodations are necessary to ensure equal employment opportunities
and benefits.” CHARLES M. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES & MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 442 (9th ed. 2017).
125. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
126. See supra Section III.H.
127. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 992–93 (2011).
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transparency. That is, maybe as several academics have argued, quadrant four
would be a better home for this class of statute than quadrant three.128
Thus, again, if jurisdictions considered the transparency/reliance matrix in
enacting salary-ban laws and the choice was made to be non-transparent, one
would expect to see the non-transparency requirement only during the crucial
period when the problematic use of salary occurs (that is, during hiring) with
permission to rely on past salary if it is disclosed legitimately outside of the nontransparency requirement. That is, one might expect the laws to fit into quadrant
four––low transparency on a factor that the employer may rely on. Many of the
salary-ban laws fit into that quadrant.129 On the other hand, it could be that the
opposite choice should be made on transparency; instead of salary “ban” acts,
perhaps they should be salary “disclosure” acts.
**********
In sum, applying the criteria discussed in Section III retroactively, the
placements of antidiscrimination protections into the matrix generally make
sense even though the decisions at the time were made implicitly rather than
explicitly. Alternatively, playing the tune backwards, it could be that given
current antidiscrimination statutes, the criteria in Section III make sense.
Sometimes, the arrow of causation can be uncertain. At the same time, however,
explicit consideration of the matrix may have changed at least one of the
placements at the time and now (religion). Regardless of the direction of the
arrow of causation, thinking about transparency and reliance helps us to
understand, analyze, and, perhaps, as in the case of religion, improve
antidiscrimination efforts.
V. A GLIMPSE AT THE FUTURE: THINKING EXPLICITLY ABOUT
TRANSPARENCY AND RELIANCE
In addition to helping us think about past decisions, and maybe improving
upon them, thinking explicitly about transparency and reliance may help us
address new and emerging issues. This section hints at the promise of thinking
of new antidiscrimination initiatives through the lens provided by transparency
and reliance. The section will not provide a detailed analysis of each area––a
detailed analysis would justify an article on each––but it will demonstrate the
potential value of explicit consideration of these two factors.
Consider first a common approach of state and local laws to expand the reach
of antidiscrimination laws: to use the Title VII framework, but simply add to the
list of prohibited factors. The Madison, Wisconsin, antidiscrimination
ordinance, mentioned earlier is an example of this.130 It prohibits employer
reliance on the Title VII factors, plus nineteen others. By default, this approach
128. See Bessen, et al., supra note 82, at 28.
129. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 62.
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places all of those factors into Title VII’s high-transparency/no-reliance
quadrant. But attending explicitly to transparency and reliance would indicate
that at least some of the factors might benefit from placement into the lowtransparency/no-reliance quadrant instead. Limiting inquiries about family or
student status or whether someone has been a victim of domestic abuse or sexual
assault may contribute to minimizing improper reliance on those factors. As a
result, placement of those factors into the no-transparency/no-reliance quadrant
might make more sense. Similarly, some of the factors, such as religion and
handicap/disability, almost certainly should be placed in one of the must-rely
quadrants, at least for some claims.131 Although the ordinance partially attends
to this,132 the ordinance could be both clearer and more appropriately targeted if
explicit attention were paid to the transparency/reliance matrix for each
prohibition considered separately instead of, as is common practice illustrated
by the Madison ordinance, lumping all the prohibitions together into the same,
default Title VII quadrant.
The transparency/reliance lens may also provide new avenues for addressing
emerging discrimination issues.
For example, consider implicit bias.
Addressing implicit bias has proven to be challenging under the high
transparency/no reliance framework of Title VII. First, it has been exceedingly
difficult to prove reliance under traditional notions of reliance since, by
assumption, the bias is implicit, that is, non-conscious.133 If it is conscious, it is
not implicit bias anymore. Second, despite that, because of the possibility of
liability for implicit bias, employers resist the idea that it plays any role in their
decision-making.134

131. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text (describing when religion and disability
would be placed in the no-reliance versus the must-rely quadrant).
132. MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 39.03(8)(h) (2022), https://library.muni
code.com/wi/madison/codes/code_of_ordinances (incorporating accommodation duty for
religion); id. at 39.03(i) (making various exceptions).
133. For articles expressing skepticism that Title VII recognizes claims of implicit-bias
discrimination, see Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1131−32 (1999);
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 42–43 (2006); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 503–04 (2010); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1056–58 (2006).
But see Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1035 (2006);
Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s A Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 128 (2013).
134. For examples of employers denying the presence and relevance of implicit bias, with
varying results, see Martin v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54179, at *67–70 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 30, 2018) (finding that plaintiff failed to tie expert testimony on implicit bias to individual
circumstances in the case); Jones v. Nat’l Council of YMCA Ass’ns, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 898–901
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (rejecting expert testimony on implicit bias); Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776–78 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding implicit bias).
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A better approach to implicit bias might be to take it out of the Title VII’s noreliance quadrants and place it instead in the high-transparency/may-rely
quadrant. If that were done, employers might be encouraged to explore the
effects of implicit bias in their decision-making without fear of liability if they
isolated its effects. Indeed, it might even be preferable to enhance the hightransparency requirement. Employers might not only be permitted to inquire
about implicit bias, but required to do so.135 A statute might provide that they
are liable if they fail to explore the possibility of implicit bias in their
workplaces, provide anti-bias training to their employees, and establish
structures in the workplace to identify, minimize, and eliminate it.136 This
framework might also apply to other emerging areas, such as
microaggressions,137 or even accent discrimination.138
Finally, the transparency/reliance lens may help us to think about how to
address the new challenges posed by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in
making employment decisions. In the process, in a forward-to-the-past move,
thinking of AI through this lens may help us think about perennial issues in the
law of employment discrimination.139 On new challenges, employment
discrimination restrictions on the use of AI are placed by default into Title VII’s
high-transparency/no-reliance quadrant. But problems exist on both sides of this
divide. On the transparency side, AI programs can be incredibly opaque to
normal human surveillance while, on the no-reliance side, even if an AI program
is instructed not to rely on a prohibited factor, such as gender, it may be
incredibly clever (and opaque) in finding proxies.140 At a deeper, forward-tothe-past level, thinking about AI through this lens may tell us something about
135. Although they obviously do not rely on the transparency/reliance matrix, Professors Jolls
and Sunstein suggest an analogous approach to implicit bias. They suggest that instead of banning
implicit bias directly, the law could be used to encourage or enable employers to take steps to
reduce implicit bias. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969, 988–90 (2006). That is what is suggested here through the lens of transparency and
reliance: no ban, but high, mandatory transparency with an obligation to take steps to address and
minimize implicit bias.
136. The obvious analogy here is to sexual harassment where employers are provided a defense
to hostile-environment harassment claims if they take proactive steps to address and minimize the
harassment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998). Through the transparency/reliance lens, this framework permits
hostile environment harassment to occur without liability (in essence, permitting reliance) if the
employer takes steps to implement high transparency directed to addressing and minimizing such
harassment.
137. See Sue et al., supra note 90.
138. See KATHERINE D. KINZLER, HOW YOU SAY IT: WHY YOU TALK THE WAY YOU DO –
AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT YOU 145–48 (2020) (arguing that accent discrimination should be a
protected category under civil rights laws).
139. With apologies to Back to the Future. See BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures
1985).
140. For good discussions of these issues, see Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action
Legal?, 108 GEO. L. REV. 803 (2020); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017).
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both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. On disparate
treatment, the lens indicates that any psychological gloss on intent in
antidiscrimination law should finally be rejected; AI programs do not have
human intent, but their decisions should be illegal nonetheless if they result in
disparate treatment of a protected group.141 On disparate impact, AI is
problematic in that it may be difficult to isolate the effect of any particular factor
in a complex program. But this problem can serve to highlight a better approach
to causation in disparate impact law. The problem of separating the effect of
multiple factors is only a problem if separating effects is a requirement of the
doctrine. But from the very earliest case,142 a more blindered approach to
causation has been used. That is, the task in proving a prima facie case is not to
separate the effect of a factor from other factors, but to compare the effect of a
factor “blindly” without consideration of any other factor.143 If this proper view
of causation is applied, AI may enhance the use of disparate impact rather than
complicate and frustrate it. The blindered data should be readily available within
the program even in situations where disaggregating the effects of many factors
is difficult or impossible.144
This glimpse at the future has been, by necessity, more atmospheric than
detailed. Each of these topics––state and local antidiscrimination laws, implicit
bias, and AI––and, for that matter, several others, merit their own article and
careful consideration. The task here is merely to indicate that use of the
transparency/reliance lens may be useful in thinking about these future
challenges.
VI. CONCLUSION
In structuring antidiscrimination laws, legislatures work with a large number
of variables. Legislators consider most of the variables explicitly. They
determine which employers are covered, what characteristics to protect, the
methods of proof, the procedures to be followed, and the available remedies.
These are all important decisions that have an important effect on the
effectiveness of the antidiscrimination effort.
This article is about two variables that are present in every antidiscrimination
law, but which have until now not been considered explicitly. The laws regulate

141. For a good discussion, see Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 404–
10 (2018).
142. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View
of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 352–54 (1996) (explaining the use of
blindered causation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.).
143. See id. at 364–77.
144. The transparency/reliance lens will be less useful in addressing the business-necessity
prong of disparate impact analysis as applied to AI outcomes: is a mere correlation between
criterion and job performance sufficient to make out a business-necessity defense, or is something
more required? For discussions, see Sullivan, supra note 141, at 415–28; Steven L. Willborn,
Righting the World: Sullivan on Disparate Impact, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1495, 1505–08 (2020).
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transparency by sometimes limiting employer access to information about the
protected characteristic, while at other times requiring broad access to the
information. In addition, the laws regulate reliance usually by prohibiting
reliance on the protected characteristic, while at other times permitting or even
requiring reliance.
The main thesis of this article is that the antidiscrimination effort could be
improved by explicit consideration of these two variables.
Explicit
consideration would facilitate a more careful tailoring of transparency and
reliance to the goals of the particular antidiscrimination effort. As noted above,
explicit consideration may improve the efficacy of current antidiscrimination
efforts, such as those relating to salary-ban statutes. But perhaps even more
importantly it may enhance efforts to expand the antidiscrimination effort into
new areas, such as microaggression or accent discrimination, or to deal with
emerging problems, such as AI decision-making.
Even more basically, however, transparency and reliance have always been
and always will be central features of antidiscrimination laws. Until now, they
have been largely hidden and addressed only implicitly. Nothing would be lost
by thinking about them explicitly, and it is possible that much could be gained.

